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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
GRANT DION BARNES, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF T55 PRQCSSPXffSS 
Defendant Grant Dion Barnes appeals his convictions for 
burglary, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-202 (1995), and theft, a third degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1995), in the Second Judicial 
District Court, Davis County, the Honorable Glen R. Dawson, 
presiding. This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
1. Was defendant convicted of burglary and theft on the 
basis of insufficient evidence? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: When an appeal from a bench trial is 
based on the insufficiency of the evidence, this Court applies a 
"clearly erroneous" standard. State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424, 
431 (Utah 1989). This standard requires that the trial court!s 
verdict be reversed only if it is against the clear weight of the 
evidence or "if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite 
and firm conclusion that a mistake has been made." Id. at 431-32. 
Case No. 970035-CA 
Priority No. 2 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The text of all constitutional provisions, statutes, and 
rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues before this Court 
is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT 0? TOS CASg 
On June 24, 1996, defendant was charged by information with 
one count of burglary, a third degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann, § 76-6-202 (1995), one count of theft, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1995) , 
and one count of possession of burglary tools, a class 3 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-205 (1995) 
(R. 8-11). 
Following a bench trial on October 3, 1996, defendant was 
convicted of burglary and theft (R. 27-28, 128-32) .x The 
district court sentenced defendant to serve concurrent terms of 
zero-to-five years in the Utah State Prison and imposed a $5000 
fine for each offense (R. 28, 30-31, 134-35). This appeal ensued 
(R. 32-35). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On appeal from a criminal bench trial, the facts are 
reviewed in the light most favorable to the trial courtfs 
verdict. State v. Reed, 839 P.2d 878, 878 (Utah App. 1992) 
(citing State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1153 (Utah 1991)). 
1
 Defendant was found not guilty of possession of burglary 
tools (R. 28, 131-32); consequently, that charge is not involved 
in this appeal. 
2 
On the night of June 22, 1996, a burglary and theft occurred 
at Mesa Moving and Storage (Mesa) in North Salt Lake, Utah. At 
the time of the crimes, David Kolesky, an employee of Mesa, was 
on the premises (R. 61) . On that night, he left the building 
after the alarm had been set and appeared to be working properly 
(R. 63) . He drove from his parking space in the back of the 
building around to the front of the building to make sure 
everything was okay there (id.). He heard the alarm go off and 
saw a vehicle with a large object in the back leaving the scene 
at a high rate of speed (R. 61, 63) . He then saw the vehicle run 
a stop sign and witnessed a police car turn on its siren and 
pursue the vehicle (R. 61). 
Shortly thereafter, police officers arrived at Mesa and 
began to investigate the premises with Kolesky (±sL,) • They 
discovered that a side door had been jimmied open with what 
appeared from the pry marks to be a crow bar (R. 61, 63, 81). A 
vending machine and a change machine that sat on top of it, both 
of which had been located on a platform up a small flight of 
stairs inside the jimmied door, were missing (R. 61, 63, 82). 
The vending and change machines were bound together by a steel 
cable and weighed somewhere between thirty and eighty pounds 
(R. 70, 72, 88). The two machines in tandem were thirty-one 
inches wide, about two-and-a-half feet tall, and about 
two-and-a-half to three feet deep (R. 90-91). Kolesky told the 
officers that the large object he had seen in the speeding 
vehicle seemed to match the missing machines (R. 61). 
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Meanwhile, other officers chased the speeding vehicle 
through North Salt Lake and into Salt Lake City (R. 62, 65-68) . 
The chase eventually ended in a crash with a police vehicle 
(R. 62, 69) . Just prior to the crash, defendant, who had been in 
the passenger side of the front seat of the vehicle, fled from 
the vehicle on foot (R. 62, 66, 69) . Defendant was eventually 
apprehended by Salt Lake City police officers (R. 62) , and both 
he and the driver of the vehicle, Stephen Phillip Murphy, were 
subsequently arrested (R. 69-70). 
Following the crash, the officers recovered the vending and 
change machines from the vehicle (R. 70-71). The fair market 
value of the vending and change machines, along with the money 
and candy contained therein, was stipulated to be in excess of 
$1000, but less than $2000 (R. 62, 86) .2 The officers also 
discovered a screwdriver and a crow bar behind the driver's seat 
in the vehicle (R. 70) . The crow bar had traces of paint on it 
which were the same color as the paint on the area around the 
door that had been jimmied open (R. 81-83). 
At trial, there was conflicting testimony as to whether the 
vending and change machines could be carried by one person. 
Although Officer Beckstrand testified that he carried the 
machines by himself, he noted that they were awkward to carry by 
2
 This fact is significant because it is determinative as to 
whether the theft involved is a second or third degree felony, or 
a class A or B misdemeanor. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (Supp. 
1997) . Because the property taken here was valued at more than 
$1000, but less than $5000, the defendant was charged with and 
convicted of a third degree felony. See id. at (1)(b)(i). 
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oneself and that he needed to put them down in order to open 
doors (R. 72-73) . Additionally, Terry Tuke, the owner of the 
vending and change machines, testified that he needed another 
individual to assist him in carrying the machines and that the 
machines were awkward to move by oneself (R. 89). Tuke 
specifically noted that the reason for the awkwardness was not so 
much the weight of the machines, but their dimensions, and that 
moving the machines down these particular stairs by oneself would 
be difficult (id.). On the other hand, Murphy, who testified on 
behalf of the defendant, claimed that he took the machines 
himself without any assistance from defendant (R. 95-97). 
However, the trial court expressly found that Murphy's testimony 
was not credible (R. 130). In fact, the trial judge specifically 
stated: "Frankly, I didn't believe [Murphy's] version of this at 
all. I sat here and watched him face to face and listened to his 
story and I assessed him to be totally incredible with regard to 
the events that happened late that evening" (id.). 
Murphy additionally testified that at the time of the 
incidents in question, he was employed as a contract laborer with 
Mesa and had been so employed for three to four years (R. 93) . 
He claimed that he and defendant had gone to Mesa that night to 
leave a note for his boss to let him know where he could be 
reached to line up work for the next day (R. 94). However, not 
only did this testimony differ from his earlier testimony that it 
was his usual practice for him to call Mesa to line up work 
(R. 93) , but he also gave conflicting testimony as to whether any 
5 
note actually existed (Compare R. 95 with R. 104) . Murphy 
further testified that the stolen machines were outside, not 
inside, the building, although he contradicted himself as to the 
exact location of the machines (Compare R. 95, lines 3-9 with id. 
at lines 13-14). Lastly, it was stipulated at trial that neither 
Murphy nor defendant had permission to be on the premises of Mesa 
on the night in question (R. 85) • 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In order to obtain a reversal on appeal based on the 
insufficiency of the evidence, defendant must, first, marshal all 
of the evidence supporting the trial court's verdict and, second, 
demonstrate how this evidence, viewed in the light most favorable 
to the verdict, is insufficient to support the verdict. He has 
done neither here. Defendant has clearly failed to meet this 
Court's marshaling requirement by virtually ignoring all of the 
stipulations between the parties that help to establish certain 
elements of both offenses. Moreover, even if defendant had 
properly marshaled the evidence, his appeal nonetheless fails 
because the evidence is plainly sufficient to support the trial 
court's verdict. Accordingly, defendant's conviction is entitled 
to affirmance on appeal. 
AROTMSNT 
I. THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTIONS FOR BURGLARY AND THEFT. 
On appeal, defendant asserts that the evidence was 
insufficient to support the trial court's verdict convicting him 
of burglary and theft. As this Court has previously noted, "[a] 
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challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence presents the 
defendant with a heavy burden." State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 
819 (Utah App. 1994). In order to meet that burden, the 
defendant must (1) marshal all of the evidence supporting the 
trial court's verdict and (2) demonstrate how this evidence, even 
viewed in the most favorable light, is insufficient to support 
the verdict. State v. Moosman. 794 P.2d 474, 475-76 (Utah 1990); 
accord strain, 885 P.2d at 819; State v. Scheel, 823 p.2d 470, 
472 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Perdue. 813 P.2d 1201, 1207 (Utah 
App. 1991). This Court will reverse a verdict on the basis of 
insufficiency of the evidence only if the evidence is so 
inconclusive or so inherently improbable that the trial court 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that defendant committed 
the crime. Strain, 885 P.2d at 819 (citing State v, Goddard, 871 
P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994)). 
A* Failure to Marshal 
It is well settled that the appellant has the duty of 
marshaling the evidence in an appeal based of the sufficiency of 
the evidence. See. e.g.. Strain, 885 P.2d at 819; S£iL££l, 823 
P.2d at 472; Eexdll£, 813 P.2d at 1207; Moosman, 794 P.2d 
at 475-76. Moreover, the failure of defendant to meet his 
marshaling burden will result in this Court's refusal to consider 
his sufficiency of the evidence claim on appeal. See, e.g., 
State v. Farrow. 919 P.2d 50, 53 n.l (Utah App. 1996); State v. 
Mincy, 838 P.2d 648, 652 n.l (Utah App.), cert, denied. 843 P.2d 
1042 (Utah 1992); State v. Moore. 802 P.2d 732, 738-39 (Utah App. 
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1990); accord One Tnt' 1 (U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp,. 350 
P.2d 447, 454 n.25 (Utah 1993); Scharf v. BUG Corp. . 700 P.2d 
1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
In the present case, defendant has plainly failed to meet 
this Court's marshaling requirement. Specifically, in his brief 
on appeal, he virtually ignores the various stipulations reached 
by the parties prior to and during trial. For instance, several 
of these stipulations concern what David Kolesky, an employee of 
Mesa who was on the premises that night, saw and heard. This 
evidence is integral to the foundation of the elements of both 
the burglary and theft charges. See Section K B ) inf^a* at 10 
to 15. Similarly, defendant overlooks the parties1 stipulation 
that neither Murphy nor defendant had permission to be on the 
premises of Mesa on the night in question, evidence which goes 
directly to the issue of whether they were lawfully present 
there, another element of the burglary charge. Accordingly, 
because defendant has failed to meet his marshaling burden, this 
Court should refuse to consider his sufficiency of the evidence 
claim on appeal. See Farrow, 919 P.2d at 53 n.l; Min^:, 838 P.2d 
at 652 n.l; Moorer 802 P.2d at 739. 
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence 
Even if this Court declines to dismiss defendant's appeal on 
the basis of his failure to marshal the evidence supporting the 
trial court's verdict, defendant's appeal nonetheless fails 
because the evidence below is clearly sufficient to support 
defendant's convictions for burglary and theft. 
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On appeal from a bench trial based on the insufficiency of 
the evidence, this Court applies a "clearly erroneous" standard. 
State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424, 431 (Utah 1989). Under this 
standard, the trial court's verdict is reversed only if it is 
against the clear weight of the evidence or "if the appellate 
court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conclusion that a 
mistake has been made," Id. at 431-32. In other words, this 
Court will reverse a verdict on the basis of insufficiency of the 
evidence only if the evidence is so inconclusive or so inherently 
improbable that the trier of fact must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that defendant committed the crime. Strain/ 885 
P.2d at 819 (citing Goddard, 871 P.2d at 543). 
As to circumstantial evidence, the Utah Supreme Court has 
previously held that such evidence may be sufficient to establish 
the guilt of the accused so long as it is of such quality and 
quantity as to justify the trier of fact in determining guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 332 
(Utah 1991); accord State v. Nickles. 728 P.2d 123, 126-27 (Utah 
1986); State v. Barlow, 851 P.2d 1191, 1193 (Utah App.), cert. 
denied, 859 P.2d 585) (Utah 1993). Moreover, " [i]t is not this 
court's duty to measure conflicting evidence or the credibility 
of witnesses. That responsibility belongs strictly to the trier 
of fact. . . . fSo long as there is some evidence, including 
reasonable inferences, from which findings of all requisite 
elements of the crime can reasonably be made, [this CourtTs] 
inquiry stops.1" State v. Lactod, 761 P.2d 23, 27 (Utah App. 
9 
1988) (quoting State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985) 
(citation omitted)); accord State v. Warden. 813 P.2d 1146, 1150 
(Utah 1991); State v. Pendergrassr 803 P.2d 1261, 1267-68 (Utah 
App. 1990); see generally State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 
1994) (noting that trial court stands in a superior position from 
which to evaluate and weigh evidence and assess credibility of 
witnesses).3 Thus, this Court must determine whether there is 
some evidence, including reasonable inferences, which supports 
the trial court's finding all of the requisite elements of the 
burglary and theft charged here-
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1995), "[a] person is 
guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a 
building or any portion of a building with intent to commit a 
felony or theft or commit an assault on any person." Theft, in 
turn, is defined by Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1995), which 
3
 Defendant cites Justice Stewart's opinion in State v. 
Workmanr 852 P.2d 981 (Utah 1993) for the following proposition: 
[T]he role of the reviewing court is to 
determine (1) whether there is any evidence 
that supports each and every element of the 
crime charged, and (2) whether the inferences 
that can be drawn from that evidence have a 
basis in logic and reasonable human 
experience sufficient to prove each legal 
element of the offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt. A guilty verdict is not legally valid 
if it is based solely on inferences that give 
rise to only remote or speculative 
possibilities of guilt. 
Id. at 985. However, since Justice Stewart1s opinion was joined 
by only one other justice, it should not be regarded as the 
opinion of the court in that case. Accordingly, insofar as 
Justice Stewart's definition of the role of the reviewing court 
exceeds the requirements set forth in Span, Nickles. Booker/ and 
Warden. it should not be considered binding precedent. 
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provides: "A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises 
unauthorized control over the property of another with a purpose 
to deprive him thereof." 
In accordance with these statutes, the State must show in 
the present case that defendant (1) unlawfully entered Mesa's 
building (2) with the intent to commit a theft. As to the first 
element, defendant's unlawful entry into the building, the 
State's circumstantial evidence rests largely on the stipulated 
testimony of David Kolesky, an employee of Mesa who was on the 
premises that night, and on the testimony of various witnesses 
concerning whether the vending and change machines could be 
carried by one person. 
Kolesky1s testimony was that he left the building after the 
alarm had been set at which time everything was in order (R. 63) . 
After he drove around to the front of the building, the alarm 
went off, and then he saw Murphy's vehicle, in which defendant 
was a passenger, leave the scene at a high rate of speed 
(R. 61, 63) . Shortly thereafter, when he went to investigate the 
building with the police, they discovered that a side door had 
been j immied open with what appeared from the pry marks to be a 
crow bar (R. 61, 63, 81). Later, police officers recovered from 
Murphy's vehicle a crow bar with traces of paint on it which were 
the same color as the paint on the area around the door that had 
been jimmied open (R. 70, 81-83). This evidence and the 
reasonable inferences therefrom, combined with the parties1 
stipulation that neither Murphy nor defendant had permission to 
11 
be on Mesa's premises on the night in question (R. 85), clearly 
establish that at least one person in Murphy's vehicle unlawfully 
entered Mesa's building that night. 
Defendant's unlawful presence in the building is reasonably 
drawn from the testimony concerning whether the vending and 
change machines, which had been located on a platform up a small 
flight of stairs inside the jimmied door, could be carried by one 
person. Terry Tuke, the owner of the machines, testified that 
the two machines combined were thirty-one inches wide, about 
two-and-a-half feet tall, and about two-and-a-half to three feet 
deep (R. 90-91), which dimensions made the machines awkward to 
move by oneself (R. 89). Additionally, Tuke testified that 
whenever he moved the machines, he needed someone's assistance 
and that moving the machines down these specific stairs by 
oneself is particularly difficult (id.). Finally, Officer 
Beckstrand, the police officer who recovered the machines, 
testified that although he carried the machines by himself, the 
machines were awkward to carry by oneself and that he needed to 
put them down in order to open doors (R. 72-73) . Given the above 
testimony, as well as Kolesky's testimony concerning how quickly 
the unlawful entry into the building and taking of the machines 
occurred (R. 61, 63), it was a reasonable inference for the trial 
court to find that both Murphy and defendant must have unlawfully 
entered Mesa's building that night. Thus, the first element of 
the crime of burglary is supported by the evidence here. 
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Additionally, even though Murphy's testimony provided 
contrary evidence concerning whether the vending and change 
machines could have been carried by him alone, this is not by 
itself sufficient to overcome the clear weight of the evidence 
standard on appeal. See, e.g.. Kanten, 813 P.2d at 1150 (holding 
that "the mere existence of conflicting evidence . . . does not 
warrant reversal"); accord State v. Blubaugh. 904 P.2d 688, 695 
(Utah App. 1995), cert, denied, 913 P.2d 749 (Utah 1996). This 
is especially true in light of the fact the trial court did not 
find Murphy's testimony credible. The trial court specifically 
stated: "Frankly, I didn't believe [Murphy's] version of this 
at all. I sat here and watched him face to face and listened to 
his story and I assessed him to be totally incredible with regard 
to the events that happened late that evening" (R. 130) . Thus, 
the mere fact that defendant is able to point to some evidence 
that is contrary to the trial court' s finding on this issue does 
not establish that the evidence supporting that finding was 
insufficient. 
Second, as to intent, the Utah Supreme Court has previously 
held: "Burglarious intent 'is a mental state of the actor. 
[T] he trier of fact must resort to reasonable inferences based 
upon [an] , examination of the surrounding circumstances to 
reasonably infer its existence.'" State v. Porter, 705 P.2d 
1174, 1177 (Utah 1985) (quoting Farno v. State. 308 N.E.2d 724, 
725 (Ind. App. 1974) (citations omitted)). "Intent with which an 
entry is made is rarely susceptible of direct proof. It is 
13 
usually inferred from circumstantial evidence: the manner of 
entry, the time of day, the character and contents of the 
building, the person's actions after entry, the totality of the 
surrounding circumstances, and the intruder's explanation.n Id. 
"Where the breaking and entering are clearly established and not 
controverted, the intent to steal may be sufficiently established 
by inference fairly deducible from all the circumstances and need 
not be established by direct proof.'1 Id. 
Applying Porter to the present case, several factors support 
the trial court's finding as to defendant's intent: first, the 
manner of entry was by prying the door open with a crow bar; 
second, the incident occurred late at night; and third, Murphy 
and defendant's actions after entry, taking the machines and 
speeding away, demonstrate their felonious intent in entering the 
building. Accordingly, the trial court's verdict convicting 
defendant of burglary is well supported by the evidence and, 
therefore, is not clearly erroneous. 
Similarly, defendant's conviction of theft is also supported 
by the evidence. In order to establish the elements of the crime 
of theft in the present case, the State must show that defendant 
(i) obtained or exercised unauthorized control over the property 
of another (2) with a purpose to deprive him thereof. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1995) . Much of the evidence outlined above 
that supports defendant's burglary conviction likewise supports 
the trial court's verdict on defendant's theft charge. First, 
there is Kolesky's stipulated testimony that upon investigation, 
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he discovered that the vending and change machines that had been 
located inside the Mesa building were missing (R. 61, 63) . 
Second, there is Kolesky's testimony that the large object he had 
seen in Murphy's vehicle seemed to match the missing machines 
(R. 61). Third, there is all of the evidence supporting the 
reasonable inference that defendant and Murphy took the machines 
together. See supra./ at 12. Fourth, there is the manner in 
which defendant and Murphy left the scene, to wit, in a speeding 
vehicle (R. 61-62, 65). Fifth, there is the evidence that both 
defendant and Murphy attempted to evade arrest (R. 62, 65-69) . 
See, e.g. . State v. Bales, 675 P.2d 573, 575 (Utah 1983) (flight 
after the commission of a crime may be considered by factfinder 
in deciding the question of defendant's guilt or innocence). 
Lastly, there is the fact that officers recovered the vending and 
change machines from Murphy's vehicle (R. 70-71). Based on all 
of this evidence, it is clear that the trial courtfs verdict 
convicting defendant of the theft charge was also well supported. 
Accordingly, it cannot be said to be clearly erroneous. 
CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the foregoing, Defendant Grant Dion Barnes's 
convictions are entitled to affirmance on appeal. 
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